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IN RE HIGHWAY & CITY FREIGHT DRIVERS LOCAL 600:
AVAILABILITY OF BANKRUPTCY
FOR LABOR UNIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]he growth and necessities of . . . labor organizations have
brought affirmative legal recognition of their existence and useful-
ness and provisions for their protection . *.".." 1 Whether labor
organizations should be afforded the protection of the Bankruptcy
Act 2 is currently under consideration by the Eighth Circuit in the
case of In re Highway & City Freight Drivers Local 600.3  Specif-
ically, two issues are presented for determination. The first is
Whether a labor union is a "person" entitled to the benefits of
voluntary bankruptcy under section 4(a) of the Bankruptcy Act.
4
The second issue-(which assumes an affirmative response to the first)
is whether 'a local union alone, or only in conjunction with its
international, is the appropriate "person" for bankruptcy purposes.
Local 600 filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy after judg-
ments totalling about six million dollars were obtained against it in
a suit under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 5
for breach of a no-strike clause in an existing collective bargaining
agreement.0 On the first issue presented, Bankruptcy Judge Brauer
held that a labor union is an ."association" within the meaning
ascribed to that term by the Bankruptcy Act 7 and, therefore, quali-
1 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385-86 (1922).
2 Bankruptcy Act §§ 1-755, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1970).
3 432 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mo. 1977). The bankruptcy court's opinion motes
that at least one other labor organization has filed a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy. An order of discharge was entered in United Bhd. of Carpenters Local
930, No. 6-73-1062 (D. Minn. Oct. 6, 1975). The bankruptcy was not resisted by
the local's creditors, and there was no reported decision entered in the case. In re
Highway & City Freight Drivers Local 600, No. 76-1517B, slip op. at 13 n.9 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 1, 1976), rev'd, 432 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
4 11 U.S.C. §9.2.(a) (1970).
5 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
6 The judgments were in favor of more than six'ty motor carrier companies
damaged by the union's strike. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local
600's affiliated parent organization, was not named as a defendant in the suit.
Motor Carriers Council of St. Louis, Inc. v. Local 600, International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 370 F. Supp. 461 (E.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 650 (8th Cir. 1973)
and 384 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 516 F.2d 316 (8th Cir.
1975).
7 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1970).
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fies as a "person" entitled to access to voluntary bankruptcy., He
found support for this conclusion in federal case law and legis-
lation.9 Viewing both the policies of federal bankruptcy and labor
law, the judge did not feel that the latter necessarily conflict with
the former such that unions should be barred from the benefits of
bankruptcy. In particular, he saw no cause to fear that unions
would irresponsibly incur liability under labor law-for instance,
through illegal strikes against employers-secure in the knowledge
that bankruptcy would cushion them from the full financial con-
sequences of their behavior.' 0
With regard to the second issue presented, the judge held that
Local 600 was sufficiently autonomous to constitute an appropriate
"person" for bankruptcy purposes, and, thus, that joinder of the
international union was not necessary in order to entertain the
section 4(a) petition."' Although he recognized that the inter-
national had effective control over the local in many areas, he noted
that the local had the power to manage its own finances, to own
real and personal property, to hire employees and outside pro-
fessional help, to make loans, and to settle local grievances.12 Call-
ing the illegal strike on its own authority was cited as further
evidence of local independence from the international.13 Weight
was also accorded to the fact that the employers who were now
complaining that the international must be joined to the bankruptcy
proceedings had omitted to join the international as defendant along
with Local 600 in the original section 301 controversy.14
On appeal the federal district court per Judge Wangelin re-
versed, holding that a labor union is not an "association" and,
therefore, not a "person" entitled under section 4(a) to the benefits
of voluntary bankruptcy. 1 In reaching a conclusion contrary to
s No. 76-1517B (E.D. Mo., Nov. 1, 1976), rev'd, 432 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D.
Mo. 1977). An alternative basis for holding unions to be "persons" for bankruptcy
purposes is that they are "bodies having . . .powers and privileges of private
corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships." 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1970).
Apparently Judge Brauer did not feel the need to develop this alternative line of
argument. No. 76-1517B, slip op. at 3-4.
9 No. 76-1517B, slip op. at 4-10.
10 Id. 11-12.
1l Id. 12-13.
12 Id. 12.
13 Id,
14 Id.
15 432 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mo. 1977). The district court, like the bankruptcy
court before it, did not address whether unions qualified as "persons" for bankruptcy
purposes on the ground that they are "bodies having . .. powers and privileges
of private corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships." See note 9
supra; notes 23-29 infra & accompanying text.
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that of the bankruptcy court, Judge Wangelin examined the lan-
guage of the Bankruptcy Act, its legislative history, and alleged
conflicts between bankruptcy and labor policies. Having held
unions to be excluded from bankruptcy coverage in the first in-
stance, the district judge did not reach the second issue of whether
a local union could petition in voluntary bankruptcy without
joinder of its international."'
In the following section this Comment argues by a thorough
and critical analysis of the statutory language, the legislative history,
and the relevant policies of bankruptcy and labor law that unions
should come within the coverage of the Bankruptcy Act, contrary to
the district court's holding. Section III examines the second issue
presented by In re Highway & City Freight Drivers Local 600,
which received only brief treatment by the bankruptcy court:
whether a local union unjoined by its international may constitute
the appropriate "person" entitled to voluntary bankruptcy under
section 4(a). In particular, the relevance of the international's
vicarious liability on the local union's debts (if such can be proven)
is discussed. The "piercing the veil" cases are shown to present a
separate issue, and it is argued that even assuming the international
to be vicariously liable on the section 301 judgment, Local 600 is
an appropriate "person" who may be adjudicated bankrupt without
the international's joinder.
II. COVERAGE OF LABOR UNIONS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY Acr
A. Statutory Construction
Section 4(a) of the Bankruptcy Act provides "any person"
access to voluntary bankruptcy. It states in full: "Any person, except
a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation or a build-
ing and loan association, shall be entitled to the benefits of this
[Act] as a voluntary bankrupt." 17 Section 1(23) defines "persons"
as including "corporations, except where otherwise specified, and
officers, partnerships, and women." 18 For purposes here, there-
fore, three types of "persons" eligible for voluntary bankruptcy can
be distinguished: individuals, corporations (other than the expressly
16 432 F. Supp. at 1330.
17 11 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1970). Regarding the excluded corporations, see Sovern,
Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act: The Excluded Corporations, 42 Mnm. L. ltv.
171 (1957).
1811 U.S.C. § 1(23) (1970).
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excluded corporations listed in section 4(a)), and partnerships 9 At
first glance, it would seem that many otherwise legally recognizable
"entities" are excluded from bankruptcy by this definition of "per-
sons." One must look further, however, to the definition of "cor-
poration" in section 1(8):
"Corporation" shall include all bodies having any of the
powers and privileges of private corporations not possessed
by individuals or partnerships and shall include partner-
ship associations organized under laws making the capital
subscribed alone responsible for the debts of the associa-
tion, joint-stock companies, unincorporated companies and
associations, and any business conducted by a trustee or
trustees wherein beneficial interest or ownership is evi-
denced by certificate or other written instrument.
20
Numerous other legal entities besides partnerships and corporations
(understood narrowly as entities organized under state incorporation
laws) are, therefore, entitled as "persons" to voluntary bankruptcy
under this broad definition of corporation:
The definition in § 1(8) [is] "meant to enlarge the statutory
meaning of 'corporation' beyond its ordinary meaning"
and calls for "a broad, inclusive construction of the lan-
guage used." The five comprehensive classes of bodies,
groups and businesses enumerated in the clause cover prac-
tically the whole range of private activities and enterprises,
except those carried on by individuals as such and partner-
ships other than the specified type.21
This Comment argues that unions are either "bodies having
. . . powers and privileges of private corporations not possessed
19 The special provisions of Bankruptcy Act § 5, 11 U.S.C. § 23 (1970) are
applicable to partnership bankruptcies. See generally IA Corxamm oN BAr muimrcy
Vff 5.01-.39 (14th ed. Supp. 1976). It should be noted that limited partnerships
are expressly within § 5 coverage period.
20 11 U.S.C. § I(8) (1970).
21 1 COLLim ON BANxsuTrcY 11.08 at 62 (14th ed. Supp. 1974) (footnotes
omitted). One argument made by the district court illustrates how far it miscon-
ceived the true character of the section 1(8) definition of "corporation," and how
far it failed to appreciate the definition's expansiveness and the definition's inter-
action with sections 1(23) and 4(a) to open up, rather than limit, access to bank-
ruptcy for miscellaneous legal "entities":
Also, section 1(8) of the Act is one of two sections [the other being
section 1(23)] that defines person. In those two sections more than ten
entities are listed, none of which are "labor organizations". The nmaxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, while not controlling, certainly sup-
ports the inference that labor unions are not considered persons under the
Bankruptcy Act.
432 F. Supp. at 1328 (footnotes omitted).
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by individuals or partnerships," or, alternatively, that they are "un-
incorporated . . . associations," and thus fit into the statutory
definition of corporation.
Both the bankruptcy and the district courts overlooked the
argument that unions as "bodies having . . .powers and privileges
of private corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships"
are thereby "persons" entitled to the benefits of voluntary bank-
ruptcy.22 Unions have several "corporate" powers and privileges;
for instance, section 301(b) of the Labor Management Relations
Act endows unions with the capacity to sue and be sued, as well as
with limited liability.23 Various other entities with these "cor-
porate" privileges have been determined to be within the Bank-
ruptcy Act's coverage. 2' Section 1(8) itself underscores the weight
22 See notes 9, 16 supra & accompanying text.
2 3 Any . . . labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in
behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United
States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district
court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organiza-
tion as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against
any individual member or his assets.
29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1970).
The nature of the limited liability privilege conferred by § 301(b) has been
illumined by the courts. In Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962),
the Supreme Court held that a union's officers and members were not liable for the
damages assessed against the union for violation of a no-strike clause. The Court
analyzed the language and policy of the Labor Management Relations Act and
stated, "We have already said in another context that § 301(b) at least evidences
Ia congressional intention that the union as an entity, like a corporation, should in
the absence of agreement be the sole source of recovery for injury inflicted by it.'"
Id. 249 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied). Every case since Atkinson
attempting to hold individual members liable under § 301 has failed. Williams v.
Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 421 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1970); Navajo Freight Lines Inc.
v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 291 F. Supp. 908 (D. Colo. 1968); Hall v.
Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 281 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Gilmour v. Wood, Wire
and Metal Lathers Local 74, 223 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Ill. 1963). Section 301(b)
has even been interpreted to mean that individual union members are not liable for
breach of a no-strike clause where the union itself is not found liable. Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
Another corporate privilege possessed by unions but not by individuals or
partnerships is perpetual succession. Because the language of the statute is that
"all bodies having any of the powers and privileges of private corporations not
possessed by individuals or partnerships" (emphasis supplied) are "corporations"
entitled to voluntary bankruptcy, possession of only one corporate privilege, e.g.,
perpetual succession, seemingly is enough, therefore, to qualify unions as "corpora-
tions." A fortiori, as argued in the text, possession of several significant corporate
privileges brings them within the Bankruptcy Act's coverage.
For a general discussion of the distinguishing powers of private corporations,
see W. FLETrca, CYCLOPEDIA OF TnE LAW OF PriVATE ConpoRAnibONs § 5 (rev.
perm. ed. 1974).
24The court in In re Carthage Lodge, 230 F. 694, 701 (N.D.N.Y. 1916)
stated:
The bankruptcy law has prescribed what "bodies" or associations of persons
shall be deemed a corporation within its meaning, and this law is para-
[Vol. 126:696
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to be given to the limited liability privilege as a determinant of
corporate identity for bankruptcy purposes: "partnership associa-
tions organized under laws making the capital subscribed alone
responsible for the debts of the association" are treated as "cor-
porations" for bankruptcy purposes and are not subjected instead
to the special partnership provisions of section 5 of the Act.25
Supreme Court dicta expressly recognized that unions possess
many attributes of corporations. In United States v. White 2 6 the
Court held that an officer of a labor union could not invoke the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination while refusing to
produce union records because the privilege is essentially personal
and applies only to natural individuals, not to corporate-like entities
such as labor unions.2 7 In comparing a labor union to a corpora-
tion, the Court stated:
Structurally and functionally, a labor union is an in-
stitution which involves more than the private or personal
interests of its members. It represents organized, insti-
tutional activity as contrasted with wholly individual
activity . .. The union's existence in fact, and for some
purposes in law, is as perpetual as that of any corporation,
not being dependent upon the life of any member.
It normally operates under its own constitution, rules and
by-laws. . . . The union engages in a multitude of busi-
ness and other official concerted activities, none of which
can be said to be the private undertakings of all the
members. Duly elected union officers have no authority
to do or sanction anything other than that which the union
may lawfully do; nor have they authority to act for the
mount. That an association of a considerable number of men under a
common name, with a constitution and bylaws, and with power to elect
governing trustees, and recognized by the statutes of the state as a single
body or "entity," and given power to own real and personal property and
sue and be sued, and act by its trustees duly elected as a single body, is
a body having some of the powers and privileges of private corporations
not possessed by individuals or partnerships, cannot be doubted. Such a
body is differentiated from a partnership.
As for the significance courts attach to limited liability, see Gallagher v. Hannigan,
5 F.2d 171, 175 (1st Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 269 U.S. -573 (1925) ("The words
'no direct individual liability for the company's debts' furnish the main reason for
the conclusion that such associations, although for some purposes partnerships,
are not to be dealt with as partnerships under the Bankruptcy Act.") See also
Pope & Cottle Co. v. Fairbanks Realty Trust, 124 F.2d 132, 135 (1st Cir. 1941);
In re Order of Sparta, 242 F. 235 (3d Cir. 1917).
25 11 U.S.C. § 23 (1970). See generally 1A Coumwn oN Bm ruprcy 15.01-
.39 (14th ed. Supp. 1976).
26322 U.S. 694 (1944).
27 Id. 699-700.
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members in matters affecting only the individual rights of
such members. The union owns separate real and personal
property .... 28
The second argument in favor of Bankruptcy Act coverage for
unions is that as "unincorporated . . . associations" they are
included in the section 1(8) definition of "corporations" 29 and,
therefore, are "persons" under the statute. This was the argument
accepted by the bankruptcy court and rejected by the district courtY0
The district court admitted "that the word association can normally
be construed to include labor unions" but justified its rejection on
the ground that "[s]ection 1(8) . . . refers to business oriented
entities with powers similar, to corporations. A labor union is not
generally considered such an entity." 3" That unions possess many
powers and privileges similar to those of corporations has already
been discussed.32  In any event, the district court emphasized that
unions were not "business oriented," that they lacked "purposes like
those of a monied business or corporation." 3 It noted that "[u]n-
like a corporation a labor union does not pool capital for the
purposes of investment and profit. Its assets are mainly its members
who can collectively obtain bargaining leverage in labor-manage-
ment negotiations. Its other financial functions are ancillary to
this purpose." 34
The section 1(8) definition of corporation does not limit the
entities that may be considered "corporations" to business oriented
entities. The only pertinent reference in the Act to business
orientation is in section 4(b) which sets forth who may be an in-
voluntary bankrupt.35 Section 4(b) excludes "non-moneyed, business,
28 Id. 701-02 (footnote omitted).
2 9 Although it may seem odd to class an "unincorporated" association as a
"corporation," this apparent contradiction in terms is explained by the broad inclusive
purpose of the § 1(8) definition to reach miscellaneous legal "entities" by stretching
"the statutory meaning of 'corporation' beyond its ordinary meaning." See text
accompanying note 22 supra.
30 See notes 9, 16 supra & accompanying text.
31432 F. Supp. at 1328 (emphasis supplied).
32 See notes 23-29 supra & accompanying text.
33 432 F. Supp. at 1328.
34 Id.
35 11 U.S.C. §22(b) (1970) states:
Any natural person, except a wage earner or fanner, and any moneyed,
business, or commercial corporation, except a building and loan association,
a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation, owing debts to the
amount of $1,000 or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt . . .
and shall be subject to the provisions and entitled to the benefits of this
title.
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or commercial corporation[s]" from involuntary bankruptcy, while
section 4(a) (defining who may become a voluntary bankrupt) con-
tains no such qualifying language. 36 The exclusion of nonbusiness
oriented entities from involuntary bankruptcy was intended to
protect religious, educational and eleemosynary institutions; it was
thought that they "should not have their laudible activities dis-
rupted by liquidation at the instance of pestiferous creditors." 37
It is perfectly consistent with this protective rationale to allow non-
business entities access to voluntary bankruptcy and its benefits.
Indeed numerous cases have held eleemosynary and other non-
profit entities to be entitled to voluntary bankruptcy as "asso-
ciations." 88
Judge Wangelin did not recognize the distinction between
associations ("corporations") entitled to voluntary bankruptcy and
associations which may not be subjected to involuntary bankruptcy.
As support for the proposition that associations within the Act must
be business oriented, Judge Wangelin cited Pope & Cottle Co. v.
3 6 There are two classifications of bankrupts, voluntary and involuntary. A
voluntary bankrupt has sought the protection of the bankruptcy court on its own
volition. An involuntary bankrupt has been brought into court by its creditors.
The test for determining whether a "corporation" is subject to involuntary
bankruptcy is whether the "corporation" is "moneyed, business or commercial."
Bankruptcy Act §4(b), 11 U.S.C. §22(b) (1970). Because §4(b) has this qualify-
ing phrase, which § 4(a) (voluntary bankruptcy) does not contain, it is more
difficult to show that an entity is within §4(b) than within § 4(a). This Comment
argues that a labor union is entitled to voluntary bankruptcy; however, labor unions
may indeed possess many of the business characteristics required by § 4(b).
Supreme Court dicta in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344
(1922), indicate that a union is very much like a business: "[E]xtensive financial
business is carried on, money is borrowed, notes are given to banks, and in every
way the union acts as a business entity .... ." Id. 385. Further, the protective
rationale, see text accompanying notes 37-38 infra, should not apply to labor unions
because a union's activities, although they may be considered laudable, are not of
the same nature as those performed by charitable, religious or educational institu-
tions. That is to say, that a labor union's function is to benefit its members rather
than society in general. Therefore, it could be argued that Congress did not
intend to protect labor unions, and thus, unions should be subject to involuntary
bankruptcy.
37 Sovem, supra note 18, at 232; see In re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent
Ass'n, 20 F. Supp. 979, 982 (E.D. Mich. 1937), appeal dismissed, 96 F.2d 1019
(6th Cir. 1938). For further discussion of this difference in the breadth of coverage
between § 4(a) and § 4(b), see In re Philadelphia Consistory, 40 F. Supp. 645
(E.D. Pa. 1941).
38 E.g., In re Allen Univ., 497 F.2d 346, 348 (4th Cir. 1974) ("[An eleemos-
ynary educational institution could be adjudged a bankrupt in a voluntary pro-
ceeding."); In re Michigan Sanitarium and Benevolent Ass'n, 20 F. Supp. 979
(E.D. Mich. 1937); In re Elmsford Country Club, 50 F.2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
Fraternal benefit societies have frequently been held eligible for voluntary bank-
ruptcy. E.g., Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. McKee, 95 F.2d 474 (5th Cir.
1938); Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. O'Connor, 95 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1938);
In re Philadelphia Consistory, 40 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1941); In re Grand Lodge,
232 F. 199 (N.D. Cal. 1916); In re Carthage Lodge, 230 F. 694 (N.D.N.Y. 1916).
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Fairbanks Realty Trust 39 and Associated Cemetery Management,
Inc. v. Barnes.4 0 The issue in both cases was whethercertain trusts
were within bankruptcy coverage-Pope was an involuntary bank-
ruptcy proceeding of a family trust and Associated Cemetery Man-
agement was a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding of an employee's
profit-sharing trust. Neither trust was evidenced by certificates of
beneficial interest. Lack of business orientation was in each case
only an alternative ground for holding the trusts to be outside of
the Act. The primary ground relied on in both was that because
the section 1(8) definition of corporation expressly includes trusts
"wherein . . . ownership is evidenced by certificate or other
written instrument" 4 (known as business or Massachusetts trusts),
such express statutory provision for only a specific type of trust pre-
empts implied inclusion of other kinds of trusts under the Act as
"associations." 4
The secondary ground for the holding in Pope-that business
orientation is necessary for an "association" to be entitled to bank-
ruptcy is relevant to that case because Pope was an involuntary
proceeding. It should not have been relevant to the Associated
Cemetery Management case; nor should it be relevant to the dis-
position of the instant case because both cases involve voluntary
bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, Judge Wangelin's construction of
section 1(8) is erroneous and to the extent his holding relies on such
it is necessarily incorrect.
B. Legislative History
The legislative history of those sections of the Bankruptcy Act
setting forth the entities eligible for voluntary bankruptcy does not
mention labor unions. Judge Wangelin addressed only the narrow
issue of whether the union was an "association" within the Act. In
39 124 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1941).
40 268 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1959).
41 ""Corporation" shall include . ..any- business conducted by a trustee or
trustees wherein beneficial interest or ownership is evidenced by certificates or other
written instrument." 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1970). Regarding the addition of the
proceeding language to the Act to extend coverage to Massachusetts trusts, see
McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HAav. L. REv. 341, 355-65
(1927).
4 2 Congress, through use of this specific language, has singled out the
Massachusetts trust as qualifying for bankruptcy proceedings, thereby indi-
cating that trusts generally are not within the purview of the 'Bankruptcy
Act. Absence of the required transferable certificates of interest is fatal
to appellants' contention in this regard.
Associated Cemetery Management, Inc. v. Barnes, 268 F.2d 97, 101-02 (8th Cir.
1959); see Pope & Cottle Co. v. Fairbanks Realty Trust, 124 F.2d 132, 135 (lst
Cir. 1941).
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so doing, he looked specifically at the legislative history of the Act
of May 27, 1926,43 which amended the definition of corporation by
adding the words "joint-stock companies, unincorporated companies
and associations, and any business conducted by a trustee, or trustees,
.wherein beneficial interest or ownership is evidenced by certificate
or other written instrument." 44 The House Judiciary Committee
indicated that one purpose of the new language was to include
within the definition of "corporation" certain trusts,45 in particular
Massachusetts trusts. The report did not say, as Judge Wangelin
suggested, 4 that inclusion of these trusts within bankruptcy cov-
erage was the only purpose of the amendment.47 Indeed, were that
the only purpose, then the language, "unincorporated companies
and associations," also added by Congress was superfluous.
The second aspect of the legislative history noted by Judge
Wangelin was "[t]he fact that the bankruptcy amendments of 1926
did not create . ..a political debate." 48 This he contrasted to the
"loud political controversy" that accompanied the proposal of legis-
lation concerning labor organizations earlier in the century.49 He
concluded that the lack of ferment attendant to the 1926 bankruptcy
amendments was "convincing evidence" that they could not have
43 Bankruptcy Act Amendment of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-301, § 1(6), 44 Stat.
662 (1926).
44Id. (emphasis supplied). For excellent background material on the 1926
Amendments, see Colin, An Analysis of the 1926 Amendments to the Bankruptcy
Act, 26 COL. L. REv. 789 (1926); McLaughlin, supra note 41.
45 The House Report concerning the 1926 amendment observed: "The object
of this amendment is to include within the scope of the operation of the bankruptcy
law, beyond any doubt, those businesses conducted under the guise of so-called
trusts." H.R. REP'. No. 877, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1926). In the House dis-
cussion Congressman Michener explained the proposed bill: "The meaning of the
term 'corporations' is broadened so as to include common-law trusts, and so forth.
Under the law today, common-law trusts, or what are sometimes called Massachu-
setts trusts, are not subject to the bankruptcy law, and this amendment cures this
defect in the law." 67 CoNG. BEc. 7675 (1926) (emphasis supplied). It is clear
that the amendment was designed to include at least Massachusetts business trusts;
it is not clear why an amendment designed to add only these particular entities
would be drafted with such broad language. Specifically there is the issue of what
Congressman Michener meant when he said "and so forth". Thus the legislative
history of the 1926 amendment is inconclusive of congressional intent to narrowly
confine the extension of bankruptcy coverage effected by the new statutory language.
46 432 F. Supp. at 1329.
47 Whether or not covered by the language added in 1926, there is the further
possibility that labor organizations were already covered by the language of the
original Bankruptcy Act of 1898 which included in the definition of corporation
"all bodies having any of the powers and privileges of private corporations not
possessed by individuals or partnerships." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 1(a)(6), 30
Stat. 544 (1898) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1970)). See text accom-
panying notes 23-29 supra.
48 432 F. Supp. at 1329.
49 Id.
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been intended to apply to unions.50 The district judge's assertion
notwithstanding, this inference of congressional intent to exclude
unions from bankruptcy coverage is most assuredly not convincing.
Four years prior to the bankruptcy amendments the Supreme Court
held in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. that unions
were "associations" under the Sherman Act.51 Following the dis-
trict court's logic, the convincing argument could be made that the
word "association" was so clearly understood to include labor
organizations after the Coronado Coal decision, that no congres-
sional debate of the issue ensued. The only proper interpretation
of the congressional silence evidenced in the legislative history with
regard to bankruptcy coverage of unions is that it is inconclusive
of congressional intent either to exclude or to include them.
C. Bankruptcy and Labor Policies
The construction of the statutory language and an examination
of the legislative history affords little toward divining whether
Congress intended unions to come within the Bankruptcy Act's
coverage. This task is especially difficult because Congress has never
specifically addressed the problem. Resolution of the issue ulti-
mately must depend on the relevant policies of bankruptcy and
labor law. The policy inquiry divides into two stages. The first
stage of inquiry is whether inclusion or exclusion of unions is called
for as a matter of bankruptcy policy. The second stage of inquiry,
on the assumption that bankruptcy policy favors inclusion, is
whether independent federal labor policies mandate exclusion of
labor unions from bankruptcy coverage.
Two main policies underlie the Bankruptcy Act: providing
debtors a fresh start through the discharge of their obligations and
avoiding preferences among creditors through the equitable and
expeditious distribution of the bankrupt's assets.52 The alternatives
to federal bankruptcy are the state creditor remedies. Ordinarily
the latter neither afford the debtor the relief of discharge nor pre-
vent some creditors from achieving a preferred position vis-h-vis
others by means of the debtor's cooperation or by being the first to
exploit the most aggressive state collection procedure5 3
50 Id.
51259 U.S. 344 (1922).
5
2 See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 559,
587 (1935). Regarding the Act's provisions for discharge, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 32-35
(1970). Regarding its provisions for equitable adjustment and satisfaction of
creditors' claims, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 91-112 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
53 See J. MACLAcELAN, LAw OF BANIMXUIPTCY § 5 (1956).
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As Judge Wangelin conceded, 4 inclusion of labor unions serves
bankruptcy's twin purposes and avoids the inequities of state rem-
edies. Furthermore, the rationale behind the express exclusion of
certain entities from bankruptcy coverage does not justify an im-
plied exclusion of unions. In the case of the excluded corpora-
tions,55 unlike other persons allowed the benefits of bankruptcy,
Congress made the judgment that relegation to state remedies was
appropriate 6  Because the excluded corporations for the most part
were already subject to extensive state regulation, the view was that
the bankruptcy policies would be substantially served by leaving
state jurisdiction undisturbed in the case of these entities.57 Unions
like Local 600 are subject to little, if any, specifically-designed state
regulation; rather they are subject to the nearly exclusive regulation
of federal labor law. 8 Thus, it cannot be argued by analogy to the
express exclusions, that an implied exclusion of unions is warranted
because they are entities appropriately within the province of state
regulation. To the contrary, the existing broad federal supervision
of unions lends support to the view that federal supervision under
the bankruptcy laws should be extended to insolvent unions. Al-
leged conflict between supervision of labor unions under the Bank-
ruptcy Act and their supervision under federal labor-management
statutes is a distinct ground that could justify excluding unions from
bankruptcy coverage, and is treated next.
The goal of federal labor policy is to promote the rights of
employees to organize and select representatives, to foster collective
bargaining between employers and employees, and, ultimately, to
favor the peaceful resolution of labor disputes.59 Bankruptcy policy
54 432 F. Supp. at 1330.
55 The excluded corporations are "municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking
corporation[s] . . . [and] building and loan association[s]." 11 U.S.C. § 22(a)
(1970). The municipal and railroad exclusions have lost much of their significance
in light of special reorganization provisions now available. See 11 U.S.C. § 205
(1970).
6 Sovern, supra note 18, at 172-82.
57Id. It should be noted that Professor Sovern criticizes the exclusions and
advocates that the excluded corporations be made the subjects of special federal
bankruptcy provisions. Id. 207-43. Of course, merely because the rationale of the
exclusions may be inapplicable to the excluded corporations themselves does not
make it any less inapplicable to labor unions.
58 The text confines its analysis to unions within federal labor jurisdiction.
Bankruptcy coverage of unions over which the National Labor Relations Board has
not asserted jurisdiction, see 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (1970), of public employee
unions, see 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and of other such special
unions may present different policy considerations, but discussion of these is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
59 See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970);
Local 174, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104
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is consonant with this labor policy. Discharge of the section 301
judgment against Local 600 for the damages caused by its breach
of its no-strike agreement with its employers will permit the union,
the chosen agent of the employees, to continue to represent the
employees in the administration of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. Absent the availability to the union of discharge in bank-
ruptcy, an employer who does not forgive the portion of the
judgment debt not capable of satisfaction out of the union's existing
assets could cripple the future functioning of the union by contin-
ually garnishing union member dues as they become payable to the
union.60 Such a state of affairs is definitely not conducive to in-
dustrial peace.61 Indeed, in order to convince the employer to let
loose its strangle-hold the union might resort to another illegal strike
with further undesirable consequences for both parties. In two cases
where employers have, sought the benefits of discharge of executory
collective bargaining obligations at the expense of employees, the
Second Circuit resolved an apparent conflict of bankruptcy and
labor policies by permitting the discharge of the employers.6 2
The employers in In re Highway & City Freight Drivers argued
that if unions are given access to voluntary bankruptcy a labor
(1962); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay.' Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454 (1957); 29 U.S.C., §§ 102, 141,
151 (1970). See generally R. Goam"_, LABOR LAw 54 (1977); A. Cox, LAw AN
ThE NA[ON.AL LABOR Poucy (1960).
60 In In re Highway & City Freight Drivers, the carriers who had obtained
judgments against Local 600 garnished the union dues, remitting only a portion of
the dues collected in the union check off. No. 76-1517B, slip op. at 1 n.1.
61 Dictum in Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248
(1970) is appropriate: "[An action for damages prosecuted during or after a labor
dispute would only tend' to aggravate industrial strife and delay an early resolution
of the difficulties between employer and union."
62 Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. ,
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975); Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod.,
Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). The court observed in REA Express:
[T]he tension between the Bankruptcy Act's policy in favor of giving
the debtor a new start and the Labor Act's policy of encouraging enforce-
ment of collective bargaining agreements was resolved [in Kevin] by
holding that, absent a clear Congressional mandate to the contrary . . .
the enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement must yield to the
bankruptcy court's power to relieve the debtor's successor in bankruptcy
immediately of onerous and burdensome executory contracts.
523 F.2d at 167-68. The Second Circuit cases do not raise precisely the same issue
as In re Highway & City Freight Local 600. They involve Chapter XI bankruptcy
reorganizations and the power of the reorganized employer-a new juridical entity-
to disaffirm an onerous and burdensome collective bargaining agreement negotiated
with a union by the predecessor employer-entity. See Bankruptcy Act § 313(1),
11 U.S.C. § 713(1) (1970). Nonetheless their approach to reconciling the policies
of bankruptcy and labor law is informative.
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union would be able "to break its collective bargaining agreement(s)
with impunity, comforted in the knowledge that a bankruptcy dis-
charge would relieve it from the full consequences of the breach." 63
There are several reasons to believe that labor unions would not act
irresponsibly if voluntary bankruptcy is made available to them.
As a bankrupt, a union must still face part of the adverse conse-
quences of its behavior through the distribution of its assets. Bank-
ruptcy Judge Brauer noted, "Experience has not demonstrated,
generally, that the availability of bankruptcy relief has been an
important, decisive factor in the course of conduct of one's ordinary
human and business affairs with another." 1 Furthermore, the
Bankruptcy Act contains a safeguard that will deter bad faith
breaches of the collective bargaining agreement. Section 14(c)(5) 65
of the Act prohibits a bankruptcy court from discharging the debts
of persons who have had a previous discharge in bankruptcy within
the prior six years. A labor union could not, therefore, con,
tinuously abuse the privileges of the Act.
III. APPROPRIATE BANKRUPTCY PERSON-THE
LocAL OR THE INTERNATIONAL?
The preceding section set forth the arguments in favor of bank-
ruptcy coverage of labor organizations. Given union access to
bankruptcy, the second issue presented by Highway & City Freight
Drivers Local 600 is which structural division of a labor organiza-
tion, 6 the local or the international, is the appropriate person en-
titled to petition for bankruptcy pursuant to section 4 (a) of the
Act. Phrased differently, the issue presented is whether Local 600
is entitled to voluntary bankruptcy in its own right or whether it
must be joined in its petition by its international.
As has been noted,6 7 only the bankruptcy court reached this
second issue. In effect, Judge Brauer applied a facts and circum-
stances test of functional autonomy. Pointing to indicia of Local
600's independence from international control of its operations and
its property, he concluded that Local 600 was sufficiently autono-
mous to constitute a "person" separate from its international for
6s No. 76-1517B, slip pp. at 11.
64 Id.; see Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., Inc., 519 F.2d 698,
705-06 (2d Cir. 1975).
65 II U.S.C. §32(c)(5) (1970).
6 6 For discussions of the structure of a labor organization, see M. FonuoscH,
A TREATISE ON LABOR LAw, §§ 110-22 (2d ed. 1965); W. LEmsnsoN, A.ajmc.
T ADE UNION DmiocRAcy, 85-347 (1959).
67 See note 17 supra & accompanying text.
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bankruptcy purposes.68  Another element given weight by the
bankruptcy judge was the employers' failure to join the interna-
tional as defendant in the original section 301 controversy.69 Hav-
ing brought the latter suit against the local as an autonomous
entity, the employers were in effect estopped from challenging the
local's autonomy to go bankrupt on the judgment debt.
Of course the problem with a facts and circumstances test is
the lack of predictability in any given case. Judge Brauer gave no
precise indication of what quantum of independence from interna-
tional control must be shown in a future case by a local union
seeking adjudication as a bankrupt person. Importantly, his opin-
ion is not inconsistent with the view that where employers can
show sufficient control by the international as would make out a
case against it of vicarious liability on the local's debts, then only
the international is an appropriate bankruptcy person and the
local's petition must be dismissed. The law is very confused on
the issue of "piercing the veil" of an international and holding it
vicariously liable on a local union's debts.1 0 In the interest of pre-
dictability, it is desirable, if possible, to avoid importing this con-
fusion into the law on the availability of bankruptcy to appropriate
persons.
The relevance of evidence of international control to the issue
of whether a local union constitutes an appropriate bankruptcy
person is tenuous at best. Although control evidence is obviously
68 No. 76-1517B, slip op. at 12-13.
09 ld. 12.
70 1n deciding whether to "pierce the veil" of formal legal separateness and hold
an international vicariously liable for damages resulting from its local's conduct, courts
have applied general principles of agency law. See International Longshoremen's
& Warehousemen's Union v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., Ltd., 226 F.2d 875, 880 (9th
Cir. 1955); R. GomwiA, supra note 59, at 218; Evans, The Law of Agency and the
National Union, 49 Ky. L.J. 295 (1961). The courts are not in agreement as to
what types and quantities of proof are necessary to establish the principal-agent
relationship. Some courts have required proof of actual participation by the
international in the conduct resulting in damage. E.g., Boeing Airplane Co. v.
Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 751, 91 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Wash. 1950), aff'd
per curiam, 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1951); cf. Barefoot v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 424 F.2d 1001 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970) (inter-
national dismissed from suit for lack of venue, no principal-agent relationship having
been shown). Other courts have inferred international participation on the basis of
evidence of international control of the local contained in the international's consti-
tution. E.g., Local 984, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Humko Co., 287 F.2d
231 (6th Cir. 1961); cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 275
F.2d 610 (4th Cir. 1960) (if secretary-treasurer of local also an "agent" of the
international then service of injunctive order on the secretary-treasurer constitutes
valid service upon the international). One court has found the fact of local union
members "furthering the organizational efforts and interests of the International
Union" probative of an agency relationship. United Mine Workers v. Osborne
Mining Co., 279 F.2d 716, 725 (6th Cir. 1960).
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relevant to the issue of an international's vicarious liability on the
local's debts, that issue is a separate one which should not concern
a bankruptcy court in its adjudication of the local's petition in
bankruptcy. The crucial point is that the discharge afforded by
bankruptcy extends only to the party adjudicated bankrupt.7' Thus,
releasing Local 600 from future personal liability on its judgment
debt to the employers to the extent such debt remains unsatisfied
after the distribution in bankruptcy of the local's existing assets
leaves unaffected any separate liability of the international on the
debt. If the employers can prove the vicarious liability of the in-
ternational on the section 301 judgment debt of the local, they
are free to do so in another proceeding.72 Rebutting the interna-
tional's vicarious liability should not be imposed as a condition to
entertaining Local 600's petition in voluntary bankruptcy.
Of course, the employers may face a statute of limitations
obstacle to an action against the international at this stage. Again,
however, this does not present a bankruptcy concern. Indeed, any
statute of limitations problem could easily have been avoided if
the employers had originally joined the international as defendant
under a vicarious liability theory in the section 301 suit against
Local 600. There is no justification as a matter of bankruptcy
policy for denial of the local's petition, absent joinder of the inter-
national therein, merely to allow the employers to recoup at Local
600's expense their tactical error in failing to join the international
in the original litigation. Similar considerations probably explain
71 Section 1(15) defines "[d]ischarge" as "the release of a bankrupt from all
of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are excepted by this
[Act]." 11 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1970). As a "corporation" a local union would have
to apply for discharge within six months after its adjudication as bankrupt. 11
U.S.C. §32(a) (1970). Absent a showing of one of the reasons justifying denial
of discharge of a dischargeable debt, see 11 U.S.C. §§32(c), 35(a) (1970), an
order of discharge would issue enjoining "all creditors whose debts are discharged
from thereafter instituting or continuing any action or employing any process to
collect such debts as personal liabilities of the bankrupt." 11 U.S.C. §32(f)(2)
(1970) (emphasis supplied).
The section 301 judgment against Local 600 is dischargeable and does not fall
into one of the Act's exceptions. See 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970).
7 2 Another possibility is that the trustee in bankruptcy could sue on behalf of
the employers against the international on its primary liability and then distribute
the proceeds of any judgment thereby obtained as a part of the local's estate in
satisfaction of its debt to the employers. One problem with this approach is
whether there is a source of authority for such a suit by the trustee on behalf of
bankrupts creditors. See Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and
Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. Cur. L. BEv. 589, 607-16 (1975). In any
event, such a suit by the trustee would constitute a part of the administration of
Local 600's bankrupt estate-that is it would necessarily take place subsequent to
the local union's adjudication as a bankrupt and probably would also take place
subsequent to issuance of an order discharging Local 600 on the section 301
judgment debt.
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why Judge Brauer isolated the employers' original failure to join
the international in the section 301 action as a significant ground
for holding Local 600 an appropriate bankruptcy person.
73
Identification of status as a bona fide union should be sufficient
to establish a local union as an appropriate bankruptcy person.
This simple identification requirement is preferable to the func-
tional autonomy test for two reasons. First, it is easier to ad-
minister and more predictable. All that is necessary is a positive
identification of the union.74 This is to be contrasted with the
potentially extensive hearing that might be necessary under the
functional autonomy test to ascertain the local's independence from
international control.
75
Second, a simple identification requirement implements the
relevant bankruptcy policy without introducing the extraneous
issue of an international's liability on a local's debts. The conclu-
sion reached in section Il that bankruptcy coverage should extend
to unions involved a determination as a matter of bankruptcy policy
that a union is entitled to discharge subject to the equitable dis-
tribution of its existing assets among its creditors.70 Whether an
entity that establishes its status as a bona fide union is controlled by
another entity is irrelevant in terms of this policy determination.
The latter entity will not be afforded discharge and its existing
assets will still be available to satisfy liability to creditors. There
is no reason, therefore, why a bankruptcy court should not defer
to legal form and recognize a local union as a person separate from
its international for purposes of being adjudicated bankrupt.
Indeed, in the analogous situation of parent and subsidiary cor-
porations, bankruptcy courts have deferred to the formal legal
separateness of subsidiaries and recognized them as appropriate
bankruptcy persons without inquiring into their substantive
autonomy vis4--vis their parents.
77
73 See note 69 supra & accompanying text.
74 Evidence such as National Labor Relations Board certification, see 29
U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970), would be probative on the identification issue.
75 Obviously, identification of the union would also be necessary under the
functional autonomy approach. All this Comment proposes is that a bankruptcy
court stop after it is satisfied as to the presence before it of a bona fide union and
that it not hear evidence regarding local independence or lack thereof.
76 See notes 52-58 supra & accompanying text.
"7This proposition can be deduced on the basis of those cases that deal with
actions brought by the creditors and trustees, see note 72 supra, of bankrupt sub-
sidiaries against the parent corporations on a primary liability theory. See Fish v.
East, 114 F.2d 177 (10th Cir, 1940); Henderson v. Rounds & Porter Lumber Co.,
99 F. Supp. 376 (W.D. Ark. 1951) (parent held liable). See generally Landers,
supra note 72, at 606-28. Necessarily the subsidiaries were adjudicated bankrupt
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IV. CONCLUSION
In re Highway & City Freight Drivers Local 600 is another in
a growing collection of cases 78 that raise issues of alleged conflicts
between provisions and policies of federal bankruptcy and labor
law. The district and bankruptcy courts adopted two very differ-
ent attitudes towards the judicial role in reconciling these two
bodies of federal law. The district court essentially "remanded
to Congress" to break its legislative silence regarding bankruptcy
coverage of labor organizations.79 The bankruptcy court adopted
the better approach. Express legislative intent to include or ex-
clude labor organizations being absent, the latter court set about
reaching a conclusion responsive to both federal policies.80
prior to the creditors and trustees bringing these actions against the parents. Had
the functional autonomy approach been taken by the bankruptcy court with regard
to the subsidiary of the parent ultimately held vicariously liable in Henderson, then
presumably the subsidiary would never have been adjudicated bankrupt.
A different issue may be presented when it is the international union which is
seeking voluntary bankruptcy. The creditors of the international will presumably
not have a vicarious liability claim against the local(s). Rather the allegation to
the bankruptcy court will be that given the international's "control" of the local,
the local's assets form a part of the international's bankrupt estate subject to dis-
tribution to the international's creditors. In such a case consolidation of the inter-
national and local might be imposed as a precondition to adjudicating the inter-
national bankrupt because it would be contrary to bankruptcy policy to release
future assets of the international from the claims of creditors unless all existing
assets under the dominion of the international are brought under the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction for purposes of equitable distribution among creditors. Cf.
Landers, supra note 72, at 628-51 (treatment of the analogous problem of consolida-
tion of parent and subsidiary corporations when the parent is bankrupt). But see
Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 499
(1976).
78 See note 62 supra.
79 judge Wangelin expressed his view as follows:
A final word on federal labor policy [insofar as it affects the coverage
of the Bankruptcy Act] is necessary. The essence of labor law is the
balance of power between labor and management. That balance may only
be disturbed by Congress. . . . Although the constitutional parameters of
the bankruptcy power may be defined by the courts, its exercise is vested
in the legislative branch.... The judicial inclusion of labor organizations
in section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act would usurp that legislative power.
432 F. Supp. at 1330 (citations omitted).
80 Judge Brauer observed:
[I]f the availability of bankruptcy to a labor organization were shown to
create strife and unrest and discord [and thus present an irreconcilable
conflict with federal labor policy], Congress can easily and quickly exclude,
by specific provision in the [Bankruptcy] Act, the availability of bank-
ruptcy to a labor organization, as it has already done to various entities
by Section 4 of the Act.
No. 76-1517B, slip op. at 11-12.
19781
714 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 126:696
A close analysis of statutory construction, legislative history,
and federal policy argue for extending bankruptcy coverage to labor
unions. Indeed, no solid justification exists for denying a local
union's voluntary petition in bankruptcy whether or not it is joined
by its international organization.
